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Abstract
Should moral criteria play any role in assessing pieces of art? In 
which way are ethical issues inscribed in literary works of art? Are 
there any ethical values in literature? Whether it is possible to be 
taught by art has been a question that has troubled philosophers since 
the time of Plato. In a way, one could argue that aesthetics, as a branch 
of value theory, began with Aristotle’s defense of the cognitive value of 
tragedy in response to Plato’s famous attack on the arts in the Republic. 
Cognitivist accounts of aesthetic experience have been central to the 
field ever since, although in the eighteenth century, it has been pointed 
out that aesthetic experience is important due to its emotional impact, 
precisely the opposite of what Plato criticized. Although one cannot 
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doubt the fact that art can have a strong emotional effect on us, the question 
is whether it is possible for art to influence us in such a way as to contribute 
to our self-development and to our understanding of the world. Moreover, 
the recent ethical turn towards art and literature redefines, on contemporary 
terms, the study of both ancient and modern philosophy by stressing the need 
to combine literature and the narrative arts into the pursuit of a common 
moral goal.
Keywords: ethics, art, literature, narrative, Martha Nussbaum.
Moralna moč pripovedi. Umetnost, literatura in moralna vednost 
Povzetek
Ali naj bi moralni kriteriji igrali vlogo pri ocenjevanju umetniških del? 
Na kakšen način se etični problemi vpisujejo v literarne umetnine? Ali so v 
literaturi etične vrednote? Vprašanje, ali nas umetnost lahko česa nauči, bega filozofe 
od Platonovega časa dalje. Na določen način bi lahko rekli, da se je estetika, kot veja 
vrednostne teorije, pričela z Aristotelovo obrambo kognitivne vrednosti tragedije v 
odgovor na Platonov znamenit napad na umetnost v Državi. Kognitivistične obravnave 
estetskega izkustva so odtlej na tem področju osrednjega pomena, čeprav so nekateri 
avtorji v osemnajstem stoletju poudarili, da je estetsko izkustvo pomembno zaradi 
njegovega čustvenega naboja, kar je natanko nasprotje Platonove kritike. Čeprav ne 
moremo dvomiti glede dejstva, da lahko umetnost na nas čustveno močno vpliva, ostaja 
vprašanje, ali je vpliv umetnosti lahko takšen, da prispeva k našemu samo-razvoju in 
k našemu razumevanju sveta. Nedavni etični obrat k umetnosti in literaturi znotraj 
sodobnih okvirov nanovo opredeljuje študij tako antične kakor moderne filozofije, 
tako da izpostavlja potrebo po združevanju literature in pripovednih umetnosti z 
zasledovanjem skupnih moralnih ciljev.
Ključne besede: etika, umetnost, literatura, pripoved, Martha Nussbaum. 
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Should moral criteria play any role in assessing pieces of art?1 In which way 
are ethical issues inscribed in literary works of art? Are there any ethical values 
in literature? Whether it is possible to be taught by art has been a question that 
has troubled philosophers since the time of Plato. In a way, one could argue 
that aesthetics, as a branch of value theory, began with Aristotle’s defense of the 
cognitive value of tragedy in response to Plato’s famous attack on the arts in the 
Republic. Cognitivist accounts of aesthetic experience have been central to the 
field ever since, although in the eighteenth century, it has been pointed out that 
aesthetic experience is important due to its emotional impact, precisely the 
opposite of what Plato criticized. Although one cannot doubt the fact that art 
can have a strong emotional effect on us, the question is whether it is possible 
for art to influence us in such a way as to contribute to our self-development 
and to our understanding of the world. Moreover, the recent ethical turn 
towards art and literature redefines, on contemporary terms, the study of both 
ancient and modern philosophy by stressing the need to combine literature 
and the narrative arts into the pursuit of a common moral goal. 
Furthermore, in this paper, I would also like to touch upon how politics 
and ideology influence art, not only in the theoretical domain of philosophy 
of art, e.g., politically motivated aesthetic theory, such as Marxist views about 
the arts such as socialist realism (Sim 1992, 441–471) or moralistic accounts of 
aesthetic theory such as Tolstoy’s Christian art (Tolstoy 1889), but also in the 
practical domain of state educational policy. In a way, both these accounts are 
“consumer-oriented” in the sense that, according to them, art is to be viewed 
from the perspective of the person viewing or hearing the work (Hanfling 1992, 
xiii). In other theories, though, the central role is played by the person creating 
the work; art is to be defined by reference to the creator’s feelings rather than to 
the feelings of the consumer, although it should be noted that the consumer’s 
feelings are also taken, to some extend at least, into consideration. 
 
1 For helpful comments regarding earlier versions of this article, I would like to thank 
audiences in Krakow (2013) and Ancient Olympia (2014), and, in particular, I am gra-
teful to George Anagnostopoulos, Leonidas Bargeliotes, Chris Evangeliou, Athanasia 
Glycofrydi-Leontsini and Carole Talon-Hugon.
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Indeed, novels, poems, ancient tragedies, plays, films—and even, although 
less often, paintings and sculptures—can affect people’s emotions and influence 
their actions, sometimes in ways that appear to do harm. A famous example of 
a poem that had an impact on human psyche but also on one’s beliefs and ideas 
about morality has been William Wordsworth’s (1770–1850) famous poem 
“Daffodils” (Wordsworth 1807) that refers to artistic creation and aesthetic 
pleasure. This poem has, in a way, been associated with utilitarian theory, in the 
sense that J.S. Mill—as he himself says in his Autobiography (1865)—had his 
first nervous breakdown after he read it, since Mill realized for the first time, 
that there exists aesthetic pleasure and that not all is dependent upon Jeremy 
Bentham’s principle of utility and its maximization for the greatest good. 
At the same time though, another question connected to the relation 
between art and morality is associated with the relevance of morality to 
imaginative literature and of imaginative literature to morality. This is a long-
standing debate that goes back to Plato and Aristotle and has its roots to “the 
ancient quarrel between the poets and the philosophers”, as it is called in Plato’s 
Republic. According to Jerrold Levinson, this issue involves two questions:
First, how can fictional narratives, being neither true nor pretending 
to truth, afford moral insight, instruction, or improvement? How can 
they give us knowledge of human nature, or of anything else? Second, if 
imaginative literature has a moral dimension, does this open it to moral 
assessment, and if so, how does the moral assessment of literature stand 
to the aesthetic assessment of it? (Levinson 1998b, 10)
Art in general, and literature in particular, seems not to be a source of real 
knowledge, of a moral one or of any other sort, given that imagining things 
a certain way, in response to a fiction, does not seem like any ground at all 
for thinking that they are that way. “Moral knowledge” could be defined “as 
justified true beliefs about right standards for judging real human actions to 
be morally good or bad” (McCormick 1983, 400). Thus, the question here is 
whether art is like philosophy in expressing universal truths, or as Aristotle 
famously claimed in his Poetics that “poetry is something more philosophical 
and more important than history, since poetry tends to give general truths 
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while history gives particular facts” (1451b3-4),2 since “a poet’s object is not to 
tell what actually happened but what could and would happen either probably 
or inevitably” (1451a36-37).3 Of course, one will argue that literary works 
cannot assert moral truths; they can merely suggest moral truths. Literary 
works do not suggest moral truths in the sense that authors intend to suggest 
certain truths or in the sense that particular readers actually grasp these truths: 
“something is true even though the author may not intend it and be quite 
unaware of it, and even though the audience may be so imperceptive as not to 
grasp it” (Richards 1926; quote in McCormick 1983, 402). Therefore, another 
question that arises, in relation to whether fictions are cognitive, is whether 
the cognitive force of fiction should be construed in terms of moral truths or 
rather in terms of moral beliefs. Literature may be a source of “genuine moral 
beliefs about real and not just fictional human actions” and “moral fictions may 
be even necessary components of any reflective person’s attempt to articulate a 
satisfactory viewpoint” (McCormick 1983, 409).
Related to the above is the question referring to the role that works of art 
might play in moral education; a question again as old as Plato’s Republic. As 
Noël Carroll points out: 
Ever since Socrates met Ion, this has been the great quarrel between 
poetry and philosophy. For in his momentous effort to depose Homer 
as the educator of the Greeks in favor of his own tutor, Plato was at pa-
ins to argue that neither literature nor art could teach anyone anything, 
since teaching requires something to teach, namely, knowledge, moral 
or otherwise; and knowledge, according to Plato, was something that 
neither literature nor art had to offer. Moreover, this Platonic tradition, 
albeit modern variations adapted for different epistemological convicti-
ons, still persists. (Carroll 2002, 3)
2 Φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν (Poetics, 1451b3-4).  
3 φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τοῦτο ποιητοῦ 
ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. (Poetics, 
1451a36-37). 
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Noël Carroll has, in his paper “Art, Narrative, and Moral Understanding” 
(1998), but also in his “The Wheel of Virtue: Art, Literature and Moral 
Knowledge” (2002), argued that fictional narratives can yield moral 
amelioration and that narrative is thus rightly subject to moral assessment, 
though there is no value to narrative per se (Carroll 1998, 126–160). 
According to Carroll, literature and art can provide a source of knowledge 
and a contribution to education, especially moral knowledge and education 
with respect to the virtues. Literary works can be regarded as thought 
experiments that encourage conceptual discrimination of our virtue schemas 
through the imaginative deployment of structures of studied contrasts that 
function argumentatively. As he succinctly points out in the conclusion of 
his paper: 
Since the knowledge in question is conceptual, it makes no differen-
ce that the cases are fictional. Since the education involved concerns the 
refinement of our grasp of virtue concepts, it is not best described as 
banal or platitudinous, but rather as affording added insight into what 
we already know. This need not always be taken as a mere repetition 
of familiar knowledge but can be an amplification or refinement there-
of. Admittedly, much of the work of argument and analysis served up 
by art, especially art that employs virtue wheels, transpires in the mind 
of the audience. But in that respect, artworks function no differently 
than philosophical thought experiments. Thus, in the great and ongoing 
quarrel between philosophy and poetry, philosophy cannot win without 
undermining itself. (Carroll 1998, 19)
Indeed, Carroll is sharp in pointing out that the very own practice of 
philosophy, its own way of arguing, is based on creating thought experiments, 
metaphors, myths, and allegories. It should be pointed out, nevertheless, that 
one could argue back—in defense of Plato and the like—that philosophical 
thought experiments are not artistic creations; they are consciously made up 
cases aiming at clarifying a philosophical argument. Similarly, myths and 
allegories presented by philosophers—like, for example, the ones in Plato’s 
Republic—are either purpose-written imaginary examples or borrowed by 
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literature or mythology, aiming at educating into virtue. So, in that sense, 
they are not at all like works of art whose intension is arbitrary. 
In “Art, Narrative, and Moral Understanding”, Carroll also provides us 
with a very useful classification of the four views that have been formulated so 
far on the relation of art to morality which he labels autonomism, Platonism, 
utopianism, and clarificationism, respectively. He defends the latter. According 
to Carroll, on the one hand, autonomism holds that art and morality are entirely 
separate, and that the latter is irrelevant to the former. On the other hand, 
Platonism and utopianism both take art as a whole to be subject to extensive 
moral assessment; but a negative moral assessment as far as Platonism is 
concerned and a positive one in the case of utopianism. According to Carroll, 
“Platonism regards all art as morally suspect”, due to its essential features, while 
“utopianism leads us to presume that, in virtue of its very nature, art, properly 
so called, is always morally uplifting” (Carroll 1998, 127). Clarificationism, 
though, the view that Carroll defends, maintains only that some narrative art, 
properly engaged with, can deepen moral understanding, through clarifying 
the content of our moral categories and principles, and that such art is thereby 
both better morally and better as art. It is better art, according to Carroll, 
because it is ultimately more absorbing in virtue of its moral content (Levinson 
1998b, 10–11).
According to a further classification made by Christopher Hamilton, 
accounts such as Carroll’s presented above, clarificationism can be termed 
as an imagination-based conception of the way in which works of art can 
be morally significant (Hamilton 2003, 37–55). Other imagination-based 
accounts are the ones presented by Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum 1996) and 
Frank Palmer (Palmer 1992). These are accounts of the relation between art 
and morality in which the moral significance of art lies in developing our 
imaginative capacity to be sensitive to the needs, emotions, and moral qualities 
of other people. Hamilton thinks that this type of insight into the inner life of 
others is characteristic of many works of art, and indeed an important part of 
their value as art. Hamilton, nevertheless, points out that such an insight is not 
always beneficial, and it is for this reason among others that many works of art 
are deeply morally ambiguous. It does not follow, according to Hamilton, that 
works of art—or the love of art in general—will make us better people, that 
Eleni Leontsini
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they will morally equip us with compassion, sensitivity, and concern for others 
(Hamilton 2003, 39). Hamilton argues that, on the contrary, they might inspire 
the cruel to do evil (Hamilton 2003, 40).
At this point, I would like to focus more specifically on Martha Nussbaum’s 
work on literature and the narrative arts, and mainly, on what I would call her 
“imagination-based utopian account”. Martha Nussbaum puts forward in her 
books Love’s Knowledge (1990) and Poetic Justice (1996) an imagination-based 
conception of the way in which works of art can be morally significant which 
clearly lies, according to my opinion, within the utopianism camp, although 
Carroll does not quite think so (Carroll 1992, 156, n. 5). I would like, at this 
point, to examine briefly Nussbaum’s imagination-based utopian account 
which focuses mainly on the moral significance of literature. 
More specifically, in Love’s Knowledge, Martha Nussbaum investigates 
the connection between philosophy and literature, the relationship between 
style and content in the exploration of ethical issues, the nature of ethical 
attention and ethical knowledge, the role of emotion in deliberating and self-
knowledge. Nussbaum also offers an argument in favor of a conception of 
ethical understanding that involves emotional as well as intellectual activity, 
and gives priority to the perception of particular people and situations rather 
than to abstract rules, a conception which, according to Nussbaum, “finds its 
most appropriate expression and statement in certain forms usually considered 
literary rather than philosophical,” which must themselves be included as texts 
within moral philosophy (Nussbaum 1996, ix). Most importantly though, 
Nussbaum’s project in this book is to reorient moral philosophy and to sustain 
a distinctive approach to moral thinking and judgment that has ancient roots 
(mostly Aristotelian), but has been largely neglected in modern thought, by 
arguing that we should take literature, and the narrative arts in general, as 
partners in a common enterprise. Nussbaum also argues that emotion and love 
are key moral phenomena important to the good life. Nussbaum, following 
Stanley Cavell (Cavell 1976; Cavell 1979; Cavell 1987), argues that we should 
look carefully into the possibility that literature not merely presents values, 
descriptions, and morally interesting cases, but also a complete standpoint 
about the good life, necessary to all who engage with the study of moral 
philosophy, but also important to moral education in general. 
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It should be pointed out though that Nussbaum’s Love’s Knowledge is mainly 
a collection of essays written at various points in time, not altogether agreeing 
completely with each other. These are bound together by Nussbaum’s “common 
project” presented in her “Introduction” which is mainly an auto-biographical 
account that provides us, nevertheless, with very interesting historical 
information about the study of literature and philosophical aesthetics, and in 
particular its reception by the Anglo-American philosophical tradition at the 
time that Nussbaum was a student. 
The questions that Nussbaum poses throughout her book are many and 
of various sorts, interesting for both literature and philosophy, but mainly for 
moral philosophy and literary criticism. For the purposes of this paper, I will 
only mention some of these questions that she poses: “How should one write, 
what words should one select, what forms and structures and organization, 
if one is pursuing understanding? (Which is to say, if one is, in that sense, 
a philosopher?)” (Nussbaum 1996, 3) Literary form is not, according to 
Nussbaum, separable from philosophical content (as autonomism claims), 
but is, itself, a part of a content—an integral part of the search for and the 
statement of truth. But this suggests, again according to Nussbaum: 
that there may be some views of the world and how one should live 
in it—views, especially, that emphasize the world’s surprising variety, its 
complexity and mysteriousness, its flawed and imperfect beauty—that 
cannot be fully and adequately stated in the language of conventional 
philosophical prose, a style remarkably flat and lacking in wonder—but 
only in a language and in forms themselves more complex, more allusi-
ve, more attentive to particulars. (Nussbaum 1996, 3)
 
Further to the above, Nussbaum also makes an interesting point about love, 
the most important emotion in ethical theory, since it is our concern for others 
that makes us moral agents:
And what if it is love one is trying to understand, that strange unma-
nageable phenomenon or form of life, source at once of illumination 
and confusion, agony and beauty? Love, in its many varieties, and their 
Eleni Leontsini
180
tangled relations to the good human life, to aspiration, to general soci-
al concern? What parts of oneself, what method, what writing, should 
one choose then? What is, in short, love’s knowledge—and what writing 
does it dictate in the heart? (Nussbaum 1996, 4)
This brings us to another question posed throughout the book: “What 
does all this mean for human life? What possibilities does this recognize or 
deny?” (Nussbaum 1996, 12) Indeed, there are many interesting points raised 
by Nussbaum in Love’s Knowledge, the most important being, according to my 
philosophical preferences, her appropriation of Aristotle. Throughout Love’s 
Knowledge, Nussbaum is referring to an Aristotelian account of morality and 
moral philosophy, to an “Aristotelian ethical position”, which also borrows 
Stoicism and the eighteenth century moral sentiment theories, such as Adam 
Smith’s. The Aristotelian ethical position is of course in opposition to Plato’s 
theory, but also to both Kantian and utilitarian theories. 
One of the most important features of this theory is the “ethical value 
of emotions and imagination”. Emotions involve cognitive structure and 
“beliefs about how things are and what is important”, as well as being 
“discriminating responses” to what is valuable, good, and proper (Nussbaum 
1996, 41). Affectivity is best put into play when controlled by the disciplined 
and essentially loving imagination of the novelist. According to Nussbaum, 
“practical reasoning unaccompanied by emotion is not sufficient for practical 
wisdom” (Nussbaum 1996, 40). This is something that, according to Nussbaum, 
Aristotle also asserts. If emotion is prevented or excluded, not consulted as 
emotion, then this in, at least, “certain contexts will actually prevent a full 
rational judgment—for example by preventing access to one’s grief, or one’s 
love, that is necessary for the full understanding of what has taken place when 
a loved one dies” (Nussbaum 1996, 41).
This is indeed a very interesting and insightful account presented 
by Nussbaum that I do not, unfortunately, have enough time to discuss 
here. Nevertheless, I would like to point out that this last point made by 
Nussbaum brings us back to the aforementioned question posed previously 
by Christopher Hamilton. It is not at all clear that art cannot pose a threat 
to morality. Nussbaum is not merely arguing, as Hamilton does, that a novel 
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can contribute to the life of virtue, but she is actually making a much stronger 
claim. She is arguing that a novel, by its very nature, rules out the possibility 
that it could cultivate a person’s cruel or wicked dispositions, claiming that 
a novel promotes mercy through its invitation to empathetic understanding, 
that it cultivates a moral ability that is opposed to hatred in its very structure 
(Nussbaum 1996, 76). This is a strong utopianism position to maintain and its 
validity still remains to be seen or is, at least, in need of further philosophical 
and not mere historical argument that Nussbaum amply produces by making 
reference to the attitudes of the Ancients towards all forms of literature in 
general and tragedy in particular. But this would require another paper. 
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